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Abstract—Most business people perceive that big four 
affiliated public accounting firms have better quality than others. 
We use the mixing method to uncover the phenomena of 
internationalization among the auditor selections. This study only 
explores the empirical aspects of western hegemony in auditor 
selection but also present. Those Charged with Governance's 
subjective perceptions of the Westernization in auditing practice. 
This study uses a sample of companies in the non-financial sector 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2016-2018. 
Preliminary analysis results show that institutional and 
individual ownership are more inclined to choose affiliated big-
four auditors than the local ones. Whereas when compared to the 
non-big four affiliated accounting firms, institutional ownership 
is consistently more interested in the big four affiliated. In 
further analysis, local institutional ownership seems to prefer 
international affiliated accounting firms. Foreign institutional 
ownership always shows a preference for the big four affiliated 
accounting firms.  Regarding individual ownership, researchers 
divide ownership into an independent, board of the director and 
management. The analysis proves that only management 
ownership has a role in choosing auditors. The ownership 
management tends to choose international affiliated accounting 
firms.  Based on the subjective perception, one of the audit 
committees revealed that there were crucial differences in audit 
quality between the local and the international affiliated public 
accounting firms.  Affiliated auditors are indeed far more 
thorough than local. Using Gidden's global modernity theory, we 
conclude that globally affiliated auditors can create new expertise 
needed by their users that is different from the past. 
Keywords—institutional ownership, government, management, 
affiliated accounting firm, Gidden 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Giddens described that the era of digitalization will always 
follow the flow of turbulent and continuous globalization [1]. 
Globalization could potentially change the thinking patterns, 
behaviour, and needs of the global society around the world. 
Globalization will tend to win international versus national 
brands [2]. Winning international brands is a manifestation of 
the wave of westernization in the business world [3]. When 
westernization is considered the most modern trend, business 
decision-makers can push the management to follow this trend. 
Therefore, this study aims to observe the phenomenon of 
internationalization in the selection of independent auditors 
empirically. Besides, this study also confirms the allegation of 
globalization trends in auditor selection using qualitative 
methods.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A possible moral hazard occurs when the principal does not 
have the opportunity to monitor various activities carried out 
by the agent [4,5].  Auditors are one mechanism to reduce 
moral hazard between them by narrowing the information 
asymmetry, especially in the digital age [6]. The direct 
stakeholder of the auditor is the owner of the company or 
shareholder.  In this study, we classify shareholders based on 
their similarity, namely: institutional ownership [local and 
foreign], government, individuals [independent, the board of 
commissioners, management]. 
Institutional shareholders are one of the components of 
good corporate governance [7]. Generally, they have the 
expertise to monitor and control company’s management [8], 
so that their active roles potentially reduce agency costs [9]. 
Although having a small number of ownerships, the 
government is fully capable of selecting auditors [10]. 
However, the government usually does not play an active role 
in monitoring their investment [11]. Auditor selection is one of 
the strategic decisions for the company. Major shareholders 
(including the ownership of individuals) actively participate in 
corporate strategic decisions [12]. The hypothesis used is:  
H1:  Local institutions, foreign institutions, governments, 
independent individuals, boards of commissioners and 
management ownerships influence the selection of auditors 
III. METHODS  
This research uses two types of data sources analysed by 
the researchers. First, we use empirical data from annual 
reports from companies registered in the Indonesian capital 
market. The sample includes all non-financial companies listed 
on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2016-2018 periods 
so that 1,009 final samples were selected. After empirical data 
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collected, researchers use multinomial logistic regression to 
analyse empirical results.  
 
Note: 
 AUDIT: Code (2) if the company is audited by the Big 
4 affiliated accounting firms, (1) if the company is 
audited by a non-Big 4 affiliated KAP, (0) if the 
company is audited by accounting firms without 
affiliation. 
 LINST: Percentage of ordinary shares held by 
institutions and domiciled in the same country as the 
country where the company is located at least 5% of the 
total outstanding shares [13]. 
 FINST: Percentage of ordinary shares held by an 
institution and domiciled in a country that is different 
from the country where the company is located in at 
least 5% of the total ordinary shares outstanding [13]. 
 GOV: Percentage of ordinary shares held by the 
government of at least 5% of the total outstanding 
shares [14]. 
 IND: Percentage of shares A and B that can be 
traded and held by individuals divided by the total 
number of ordinary shares outstanding. 
 INDEP: Percentage of company ordinary shares held 
by individuals (other than management and BOD) of 
the total outstanding common shares.   
 MAN: Percentage of company ordinary shares held 
by corporate insiders of the total outstanding common 
shares. 
 BOD: Percentage of common shares of companies 
owned by executive directors of the total outstanding 
shares. 
Secondly, the researcher gets the data from an audit 
committee of a listed company in the Indonesian capital 
market. Before becoming an audit committee, the informant 
had sufficient experience in one of the big four affiliated public 
accounting firms. Data obtained from informants is qualitative 
data that is used by researchers to answer internalization trends 
in the selection of independent auditors.  By having an in-depth 
interview, the researcher will have a thick understanding of 
those phenomena from the other side. In this stage, researchers 
used Giddens as a methodological theory. Methodological 
theory is actually a tool for qualitative researchers to analyse 
and explain the social behaviour of such phenomena in 
different ways according to the paradigmatic assumptions 
adopted [15]. Social theory is a methodological theory that is 
often used by qualitative researchers to connect findings into a 
coherent interpretation [16]. There are several leading social 
theories produced by social theorists, including Anthony 
Giddens, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Harold Garfinkel, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Erving Goffman.  This study uses the theory 
of globalization proposed by Gidden as a qualitative data 
analysis tool. 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Results 
The results section should explain the findings of the 
research. It can include the tables of final data analysis or 
anything that indicates the results of the study. Empirical data 
shows that listed companies choose local-non-affiliated firms 
(6.6%), non-Big four affiliated firms (62.6%), and Big 4 
affiliated firms (30.7%). The data shows that the majority of 
companies in Indonesia choose non-Big four affiliated firms. 
Table 1 shows the addition of independent variables correctly 
classified cases at 70.7%. Table 2 shows the results of testing 
all parameters. The table consists of two parts. The top 
compares the selection between local and big-4 affiliated audit 
firms. While the bottom compares the choices between non-big 
four and big-4 affiliated. 
TABLE I.  CLASSIFICATION TABLE 
 
Predicted 
Observed 0 1 2 
Percent 
Correct 
0 7 58 2 10,4% 
1 10 538 84 85,1% 
2 0 142 168 54,2% 
Overall Percentage 1,7% 73,1% 25,2% 70,7% 
TABLE II.  SUMMARY OF PARAMETER ESTIMATION
AUDITa B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
0 Intercept 42,179 3,716 128,844 1 0  
LINST -3,757 0,831 20,441 1 0,000** 0,023 
FINST -7,321 1,126 42,258 1 0,000** 0,001 
GOV -1,791 1,38 1,685 1 0,194 0,167 
INDEP -0,89 1,731 0,265 1 0,607 0,41 
MAN -10,232 4,411 5,381 1 0,020* 3,60E-05 
BOD -1,876 1,76 1,136 1 0,287 0,153 
SIZE -1,456 0,127 130,789 1 0,000** 0,233 
COMPLX 0,013 0,008 2,622 1 0,105 1,013 
GROWTH 0,66 0,236 7,803 1 0,005** 1,935 
LEV 0,894 0,313 8,174 1 0,004** 2,444 
ROA -4,564 0,703 42,192 1 0,000** 0,01 
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       Table 2. Cont. 
AUDITa B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
1 Intercept 27,565 2,381 134,06 1 0  
LINST -0,618 0,519 1,416 1 0,234 0,539 
FINST -2,708 0,544 24,768 1 0,000** 0,067 
GOV 0,148 0,724 0,042 1 0,838 1,16 
INDEP 0,353 1,456 0,059 1 0,808 1,424 
MAN 0,676 1,685 0,161 1 0,688 1,965 
BOD -0,898 1,17 0,59 1 0,443 0,407 
SIZE -0,908 0,079 130,788 1 0,000** 0,403 
COMPLX 0,012 0,004 10,639 1 0,001** 1,012 
GROWTH 0,345 0,191 3,26 1 0,071 1,412 
LEV 0,212 0,268 0,626 1 0,429 1,236 
ROA -4,042 0,655 38,104 1 0,000** 0,018 
** significant in level 1%; * significant in level 5%    
 
Local institutional ownership (LINST) prefers international 
affiliated auditors, both Big 4 and non-Big four affiliated. 
Based on table 2, increasing local institutional ownership 
significantly reduces the possibility of choosing the local 
without affiliation by 43.48 times (coefficient value -3.756, p 
<0.01) compared to selecting the Big-four affiliated. When 
comparing the effect of choosing non-Big four and Big-four 
affiliated, the results were not significant (coefficient values -
0.618 and sig = 0.234). Meanwhile, foreign institutional 
ownership (FINST) shows a tendency to choose big-four 
affiliated accounting firms. An increase in foreign institutional 
ownership significantly reduces the possibility of selecting the 
local [non-affiliated] by 1000 times (coefficient value -7,321, p 
<0.01) compared to choosing the Big 4 affiliated. Increasing 
foreign institutional ownership is also significantly reducing 
the possibility of selecting the local [non-affiliated] by 14.93 
times (coefficient value -2.708, p <0.01) compared to choosing 
the Big 4 affiliated firms.  
On the other side, government ownership [GOV] proves 
that there is a considerable influence on the selection of 
auditing firms. Table 2 shows that an increase in government 
ownership does not significantly influence the probability of 
firms choosing local non-affiliated accounting firms 
(coefficient values -1.791 and sig = 0.194) compared to Big 4 
affiliated firms. Increasing government ownership also does 
not significantly influence the probability of firms in choosing 
non-Big four affiliated firms (coefficient value = 0.148 and sig 
= 0.838) compared to selecting a national KAP affiliated with 
Big 4.  
Managerial ownership influences the selection of the 
international affiliated auditors, both Big 4 and non-Big 4.  
Hereafter, BOD appears not affecting the choice when 
comparing local-non-affiliated and affiliated-big 4 with 
coefficient values -1,876 and sig = 0.287, but also the 
comparison between non-big affiliated four and big four 
affiliated with coefficient values of -0.889 and sig = 0.194. 
Instead, managerial ownership significantly reduces the 
possibility of choosing non-affiliated auditing firms 
(coefficient value -10,231, p <0.05) rather than Big-4 affiliated 
ones. 
B. Discussion  
1) Trend of internationalization: Foreign institutional 
investors are more demanding than local institutional 
investors. Basically. Foreign institutional investors do want 
top-performing companies. Foreign ownership drives 
companies to go with the flow of globalization by following 
global convergence in financial reporting [17]. Institutional 
ownership holds a monitoring function within the company 
through the selection of high-quality auditors [18]. Local 
institutional investors only ask companies to be audited by 
affiliated audit firms, while foreign institutional investors ease 
higher audit quality by choosing big-4 auditors. Assert that 
foreign institutional investors are in unfavorable conditions 
[related to information] compared to local institutional 
investors [13].  Foreign institutional investors potentially have 
sharper information asymmetry when investing outside their 
countries because they must speculate in the limitations of 
accounting information that is difficult to understand. As a 
consequence, foreign institutional investors will ask the 
superior quality auditors to monitor their investments outside 
their countries, thus narrowing the information asymmetry 
[19].  
Individual ownership also influences the selection of 
independent auditors, though not all of them. The majority of 
independent individual ownerships does not have a large 
proportion of shares in companies selected as observational 
samples compared to others. The small portion of independent 
individual shareholding makes the voice scattered and 
incomplete [20], so it does not have the opportunity to 
contribute directly to various strategic decisions [21], including 
the selection of independent auditors. The information 
asymmetry of independent individual investors tends to be 
higher than institutional investors due to limited information 
[22]. The collective action theory shows how institutional 
investors are able to control management with their strength 
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and legitimacy to management [23]. Associated with securing 
the investment of independent minority individual investors, 
they are also unable to sue for losses due to misinformation, 
because there is no governance to protect them, so the cost for 
individual monitoring costs are relatively high [24].  Moreover, 
most independent individual investors tend to buy shares for 
short-term speculation to earn their profit [25].  Accordingly, 
they are reluctant to spend money on monitoring and control 
costs for management activities [20], and tend to sell 
ownership when the company's performance is not satisfactory 
[21]. Managerial ownership shows a significant influence in 
the selection of auditing firms. An increase in managerial 
ownership increases the likelihood of choosing an international 
affiliated auditing office. There are several arguments why 
management accepts international-affiliated auditors because 
the use of lower quality auditors can charge agency costs to 
management in the form of lower compensation and 
restrictions on access to funding from external parties [26]. 
Furthermore, the selection of high-quality auditors will help 
management to convey positive signals related to the quality of 
the information in the financial statements (partners). This 
strategy brings economic benefits that have the potential to 
increase the value of the company in the form of improving 
credit ratings, reducing the cost of capital and supervision 
intensity by creditors. 
2) The expertise of the past, present and tomorrow: The 
empirical evidence above provides evidence that the owners of 
listed companies look like they are following the 
internationalization trend in auditor selection. This section 
seeks to answer whether the use of foreign affiliates is a 
globalization trend from the side of the audit committee 
members. Mr. Margono is one of the audit committees at 
Gajah Co. [one of the companies listed on the Indonesia stock 
exchange] since 2017. Gajah Co. using the services of a local-
unaffiliated international auditor. Because Mr. Margono is an 
alumni auditor of the big-4 affiliated accounting firm, Mr. 
Margono was able to monitor the work of non-affiliated 
auditors in his company, as stated in the following statement:  
"As an auditor, I make an evaluation. I make a report that 
shows my assessment to the auditor."  
As the audit committee, Mr. Margono wants the auditors to 
work with full attention, especially Gajah co. is engaged in the 
industrial estate.   
Mr. Margono asserts that industrial estate industry has 
different characteristics from the general industry because it 
involves a variety of agreements that have legal consequences. 
It is what he said: 
“The accuracy is lacking for local. Thoroughness, 
neatness..o..carefulness in reading material sheets or notarial 
deeds..notary deeds related to third party agreements, bank 
agreements. I pay more attention to things more related 
to..disclosure, from the disclosure, I pay more attention to the 
disclosure of the agreement.” 
The inability to read a legal agreement will deteriorate the 
independence related to capabilities in carrying out their work. 
The ability to understand the essence and impact of 
implementing legal contracts is a new expertise for auditors in 
the present and future. As Giddens said, that The global world 
will force global citizens to bring up unique expertise [1],  
including auditors. The ability to read a legal agreement is not 
a mandatory skill of the auditor in the past. However, 
globalization, with its modernization, will redefine the 
expertise of auditors. Businesses, including auditors, must 
conduct reskilling that combines new skill and knowledge, to 
create a new differentiated identity [27]. For this reason, global 
quality auditors must always develop new experts to survive 
and win in the global world. 
What abilities does the audit committee of the Gajah Co. 
want?  Mr. Margono asked the auditor to understand how the 
implementation of a legal agreement, so that the auditor could 
estimate the economic impact of compliance or violation of the 
legal agreement on the financial statements, as he revealed:   
"About the numbers are the same .. the figures are 
relatively the same..coincidentally, I am more..so far, because 
many people look at the numbers include the accounting 
manager, the company.. All pay attention to the accuracy of the 
numbers, so I pay more attention to matters more related to ... 
disclosure " 
The statement above implies that technical ability related to 
numbers is the expertise required by the auditor. Still, Mr. 
Margono asked for more than that, namely the ability to 
understand the impact of a disclosure on the financial 
statements carefully.  The auditor profession has entered the 
grip of the global world. Gidden illustrates that abstract 
systems will work in globalization [27]. He claims that abstract 
systems will reduce overall risk in certain areas, but will create 
other risks in new areas. The dangers faced by the auditor will 
also change. Risks arising from clerical work begin to be 
reduced by modernization. Because of the help of 
modernization, Mr. Margono did not scrutinize the accuracy of 
the numbers in the financial statements. Mr. Margono believes 
that the auditor has adequate clerical capabilities. 
Is internationalization a form of western hegemony? 
Giddens assert that globalization has created new economic 
and cultural zones throughout the world [1,28]. Thus, not only 
do western countries feel it but also all corners of the world 
receive their impact. On the contrary, globalization potentially 
creates reverse colonization from developing countries to 
developed countries [27].  The trend of selecting international 
affiliated auditors is not a manifestation of westernizing, rather 
than finding for new unique expertise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This study answers about the existence of westernization in 
auditor selection. This study empirically analysed the 
behaviour of company owners based on five major groups, 
namely ownership of local and foreign institutions, 
government, independent individual, BOD, and managerial. 
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Empirical facts prove that foreign institutional investors tend to 
choose a big-four affiliated accounting firm. Meanwhile, local 
institutional ownership and managerial individuals only require 
international affiliation. 
On the other hand, the role of government, independent 
individuals, and BOD ownership does not appear in the 
selection of auditors. Based on an analysis using global 
modernity theory, there is a new expertise that must be 
provided by the auditor. New expertise requires both 
knowledge and skills. Thus, this study answers that 
internalization does not mean Westernization. This study does 
not examine how the behaviour of other interested parties other 
than the owner. The use of BOD, the audit committee, and 
management characteristics will provide new knowledge in 
terms of auditor selection.  
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